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‘Will The Storm Soon Be Over?’
Winners and Losers in the 1997
Crisis in Rural Java
Gerben NOOTEBOOM*
Pande Made KUTANEGARA**
In academic and non-academic literature about the 1997 crisis in Indonesia,
different, and often contrasting, views on its effects are found. In early reports and
accounts on the effects of the crisis, essentially two contrasting observations
dominate the debates. Some focus on the large number of losers, especially on Java:
people who lost work, income, and welfare; while others mention winners, often
outside Java, who benefited from the crisis due to their access to land, capital, and
export resources. Nowadays, the heterogeneous impact of the crisis, with some
areas in Indonesia suffering while others appear to be better off in absolute terms,
is generally acknowledged. “The crisis has taken different shapes, and has had
varied and often highly contradictory impacts in different regions, economic sectors
and among different social groups. The crisis has generated both winners and
losers, in economic, political and social terms” (White et al. 2002b: 149-150). It has
been recognized that Java has been hit more by the crisis than the resource-rich
and export-oriented outer islands, where farmers have access to more land and
grow more crops for the world market. In brief, during the crisis, export-oriented
segments of the agricultural sector have done well, while other aspects of the rural
economy have stagnated or fallen back (Evans 1998, Sumarto et al. 1998: 4, Warr
1999: 24-26, 2000).1
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Although many studies on the crisis have been carried out, and new ones are
still produced, little is known about the people who were among the hardest hit
and about what happened to them during the crisis. What are the impacts of such a
‘crisis’ in the lives of weak and vulnerable groups? How has the crisis been
perceived by them, and what does it reveal about the basic structures of society? In
this article, we deal with such questions for rural Java and argue that the study of
the crisis is an opportunity to gain more insights into underlying features and
processes of change in Indonesian society. What can we learn from this crisis? Has
it been ‘revelatory’ (Solway 1994: 3)? Will life ever be as it was before? Was it just
a period of minor turmoil? According to White et al. (2002b), the study of a crisis is
a good way to study underlying features of a society, which would otherwise not be
visible: “Crisis also exposes the failure or predicament of particular models of
social, economic and/or political development, and by definition after crisis things
will never be the same again; the nostalgic desire of some groups to ‘return to
normal’ (to a pre-crisis situation) is actually not so much a lament for the past as a
lament for a future which needs to be constructed” (White et al. 2002b: 150).
The aim of this article is twofold: In the first place, we want to describe and
analyze the effects of the crisis on different categories of poor villagers in two
villages in rural Java; secondly, we want to understand and evaluate the
government’s role at the local level in fighting the crisis in its early years. In this
way, we hope to contribute new insights to the question of whether fundamental
changes are taking place in the social, economic, and political structures of rural
Java, and of Indonesia at large.2
To achieve this goal, we present case studies of two villages in Java during the
crisis, and show how the effects of the crisis vary for a number of categories of
people in these villages. The article is based on material gathered during a one-and-
a-half-year anthropological fieldwork conducted during the economic crisis. The
first study, by Kutanegara, took place in the village of Sriharjo, Central Java,3 while
the second was carried out by Nooteboom in Krajan,4 a remote village in
Bondowoso, East Java. At several stages, we visited each other to fine-tune
operational definitions, questions, and topics.
This research dealt with poverty, coping strategies, labor and migration, and the
role that the local government played in fighting the crisis. Extended household
surveys were carried out on expenditure, survival strategies, and changes in
incomes and work at the beginning of the crisis, in early 1998.5 In Sriharjo, 352
families were surveyed, and 100 in Krajan, covering more than 15% of all
households in each research location. To gain further insights into the nature of the
crisis and its effects, we decided to repeat the village survey in mid-1999.6 The
research thus lasted from mid-1997 until mid-1999, with a six-month break.
Besides surveys, a number of qualitative research methods, ranging from life
histories, participant observation, to semi-structured interviews, were used.
Sriharjo is an example of a lowland village where commercialized agriculture is
prevalent. The majority of the village population of 9,300 are excluded from
agriculture, resulting in a high number of urban workers. Before the crisis, land in
4 Gerben Nooteboom & Pande Made Kutanegara
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president, could not do much either. This political disarray at the national level
surely forms an important context for explaining and understanding the lack of
government policies and leadership that was displayed during the crisis.
During the first year of the crisis, government concern, analysis, and policies
were predominately oriented towards cities rather than rural areas.10 For this
reason, urban problems dominated the national political and academic discourses,
while rural areas remained out of the picture. This is partly understandable, given
that in-depth studies on the crisis in rural areas were fragmented, often
contradictory, and not readily available. Moreover, the government hardly took any
initiatives for research in rural areas and was more concerned with maintaining
control over the country and remaining in power (Holtzappel et al. 2002: 12).11 Of
these early reports on the effects of the crisis, those from (often World Bank
related) economists were among the most influential,12 and the central government
directed its attention mainly toward the huge urban problems, such as mass
unemployment, budget deficits, company bankruptcy, and restructuring of the
banking sector.13 The lack of concern for rural areas was mainly due to a lack of
reliable and differentiated information14 on the effects of the crisis in such areas.15
At the dawn of the crisis, the government was very hesitant to take action,
seeming to believe that the rural areas were not really affected and could cope with
the difficulties. Soeharto said on television, a few months before his fall, that “[t]he
storm will soon be over” (Badai pasti berlalu). The initial governmental responses
were not effective and had nothing to do with fighting the causes, as is demonstrated,
for instance, by the Cinta Rupiah (“Love your own currency”) campaign, an appeal on
rich Indonesians’ wives to donate their golden jewelry to strengthen the currency,
the distribution of rice packages (nasi bungkus), and the public exchange of American
dollars for rupiahs by government officials and wealthy people.
In August 1998, as the crisis continued and its severe effects could no longer be
neglected, the World Bank-sponsored Social Safety Net programs (JPS, Jaring
Pengaman Sosial) came into effect. Designed to lessen the negative social effects of
the crisis, they included programs for enhancing food security (cheap rice,
subsidies for sembako,16 increased rice price interventions, etc.); for creating jobs;
for supporting credit for small and medium enterprises; and for social protection,
for education and health.
NEW ORDER ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POVERTY
Many accounts, academic and non-academic, report that Indonesia has experienced
periods of rapid economic development, socio-economic and political change,
interspersed with severe crises.17 The 1997 crisis, which eventually led to the fall
of Soeharto and the New Order rule, is the most recent. The question arises as to
whether the 1997 crisis in Indonesia reveals fundamental features of social,
economic, and political change.
Notwithstanding the setback to Indonesia’s economic development, impressive
changes have taken place at the economic, social, cultural, and demographic levels
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in recent decades. Just to mention a few since independence, population growth
has decreased, education has improved, economic growth has increased, and large
numbers of the rural population have migrated to the big cities. These
developments have led to widespread commercialization, commoditization,
industrialization, urbanization, globalization, as well as to individualism and
Islamization.
Economic development during the New Order regime has also brought about a
gradual shift in attention, from rural to urban areas and to urban problems of
unemployment and poverty. The earlier New Order attention to rural areas had
materialized in a series of rural development programs, such as the Green
Revolution program,18 the ‘Colt Revolution’,19 road construction projects,
electrification and the development of small-scale industries. In general, from 1975
to 1997, living conditions in rural areas of Indonesia improved significantly. At the
same time, in most areas, pressure on rural resources did not further increase, due
to decreasing fertility levels and the migration of many, often landless, villagers to
the cities or outer islands in search of work. New Order policies created rapid
agricultural development and increased rural incomes, but also put a strain on
employment.20 While agricultural production increased, inequality grew,
employment opportunities for landless villagers decreased, and a growing number
of young villagers left to work in the cities.21
As another effect of this development, villages have become less isolated and to
some extent urbanized. Many rural areas in Java have started to look like desakota
or rurban regions (McGee et al. 1997), and urban and rural economies have started
to merge. Therefore, when urbanized Java was affected by the severe crisis of
1997, rural areas were similarly affected. Even in remote rural areas, both inside
and outside Java, the crisis was felt with much force.
Notwithstanding the New Order’s major achievements in creating economic
growth and reducing poverty, widespread and persistent poverty remained a
problem. According to official statistics, in 1991, 15% of the population were living
below the poverty line, and larger numbers were living just above it.22 In 1998,
after the start of the economic crisis, real wages dropped by 40% (Breman 2000:
27), and a large proportion of the population was again living below the poverty
line, while many more were facing difficulties in making ends meet and running
the risk of falling below that line.23 These figures indicate that, in the middle or
longer term, the need to create and maintain a secure livelihood for large numbers
of Indonesians remains very important and deserves continuing attention.
Poverty is a contested concept. Generally and primarily, it refers to a state of
insufficient satisfaction of basic needs due to the people’s poor economic
conditions. Being poor means being unable to make ends meet. The causes of
poverty are then a lack of ownership of or command over assets, resources, and
monetary incomes. Generally, a distinction is made between relative and absolute
definitions of poverty. Absolute poverty occurs when people fail to receive
sufficient resources or income to support a minimum level of physical health and
efficiency, often expressed in terms of caloric input or nutritional levels. Relative
poverty is defined by the general standards of living in different societies and what
is culturally defined as being poor, rather than by some absolute level of
deprivation. We here adopt a relative definition of poverty, as it allows for an
analysis of the perceptions and experiences of people in poverty and offers
opportunities to look at wider consequences of poverty, such as vulnerability. This
comes to the fore especially in cases of adversity or crisis, when scarce possessions
are at risk or may be lost. The difference between being vulnerable or not is
expressed in terms of being excluded from or a member of systems of
redistribution of and access to goods (either government organized or at the local
level). 
In ‘classical’ poverty studies, these dimensions of exclusion from social
relationships, care, time, and other indirect and potential access to resources are
often neglected or overlooked. Most studies have been essentially static in their
attempt to define absolute standards of poverty.24 Definitions with fixed ‘poverty
lines’ of so many dollars per day do not make much sense when prices and basic
needs differ between societies, and when part of the economy is non-
commoditized. Moreover, the irrelevance of a dollar-based poverty line became
clear during the crisis. In a situation of a rapidly devaluing national currency, many
people suddenly fall below the poverty line, while their purchasing power of locally
available basic needs initially remains unchanged.
We therefore adopted a broader perspective, taking social relations and support
networks into account. By doing this, we acknowledge that villagers do not stand
alone, but need and use other people and institutions for access to resources,
support, social protection, and care. In our studies, these issues were examined by
making use of a social security perspective. With the phrase ‘social security,’ we
refer to the collective ways in which people, households, and local communities try
to protect their living against shocks and stress that threaten the continuity and
stability of their livelihood. We refer to both state-organized and non-state and
locally organized forms of social security.25 Locally organized social security is often
called ‘informal’, or ‘traditional’ social security.26 These forms of social security are
not embedded in state regulations and legislation and mostly not formalized in
written rules and regulations, they are context specific, restricted to small areas,
and mainly organized by local people.
In our opinion, we need to go beyond the limitations of both poverty and
livelihood studies by examining the experience of and responses to shocks and
stress in rural livelihoods related to village social security and support networks.
Both classical poverty and livelihood studies are mainly oriented toward incomes
and economic conditions, and are usually focused on the here-and-now. Besides,
the term poverty is viewed as negative, and many poverty studies have a
condescending connotation, tend to be static, oriented solely toward the poor and
destitute in society. Livelihood studies, on the other hand, being oriented to the
actor and the people’s livelihood strategies, are overly positive, even if these people
are left without any choice or hope of improvement.
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A TALE OF TWO VILLAGES
The Crisis in Sriharjo
The Sriharjo Setting
Sriharjo lies in Central Java, some 25 km to the south of Yogyakarta, at the foot of
the Sewu limestone hills (Pegunungan Sewu) that rise from the Indian Ocean, and
on the road to Gunung Kidul, close to the Imogiri cemeteries where the Sultans of
Yogyakarta have been buried for centuries. Desa Sriharjo is relatively poor in
natural resources, due to its large area of barren limestone hills, except for a strip
of irrigated rice fields (sawah) along the river and the main road. The higher part of
Sriharjo produces cassava, maize, and some bananas for subsistence, as well as teak
wood, chillies, and vegetables for the local and regional markets. The irrigated
lowland areas produce rice, maize, soya beans, and vegetables for the market.
The overall population of the desa, around 9,300, is scattered over thirteen
hamlets. The limestone hills, making up 60% of the village area, hosts 30% of the
population. The fertile lower part has 40% of the total area and 70% of the
population. The hilly part is far more isolated and poor than the lower part. Its
inhabitants are referred to as wong gunung (mountain people), which carries the
negative connotation of backward, uneducated, and traditional, while the
inhabitants of the lower part are referred to as wong ngare (lowland people), which
has a positive meaning. Transport facilities in lower Sriharjo are very good and
many villagers travel daily back and forth to their work in Yogyakarta, most of the
wong gunung by bike, the wong ngare by motorcycle. In the hills, roads are narrow,
not metaled, and muddy in the rainy season.
Sriharjo is known in the academic literature due to the pioneering research on
poverty and inequality by Singarimbun and Penny in the early 1970s, which resulted
in one of the first Indonesian books on poverty.27 Although for many years poverty
had been a sensitive subject in Indonesia, since it did not officially exists, these
authors showed that there was widespread and persisting poverty28 in Sriharjo.
From the end of the 1960s, rural development programs implemented by the
New Order government started to improve the economic conditions in rural Java
and villages such as Sriharjo, and poverty started to slowly decline. A restudy
conducted by Singarimbun in 1989 (Singarimbun 1996) showed that poverty
declined from 70% of the villagers in 1969 to 42% in 1989. (During the early crisis,
in 1998, we found that this percentage had risen again to 70% of all Sriharjo
villagers.) In the same period of twenty years (1969-1989), income from non-
farming activities (including work in Yogyakarta) rose from 16% to 69% of total
village income and the contribution of the agricultural sector to average household
incomes fell from 84% to 31%.
But more changes took place. The number of villagers having access to land
declined considerably over the past thirty years: Villagers with little or no land rose
from 49% to 76%, and villagers with no land at all rose from 37% to 53%.29 As
employment in agriculture has decreased due to new labor saving techniques, most
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of the villagers have lost access to land. These transformations in lowland Java, with
severe implications on the economy of Sriharjo, lay behind the increased migration
to the big cities and the increased importance of remittances from the cities for the
village economy and the villagers’ livelihoods. Despite these developments, a large
proportion of the Sriharjo people remained poor. Who were these poor in 1997?
Since the early 1970s, not much has changed in the characteristics of poverty in
Sriharjo. There are still poor among those who are landless, who have no access to
land, and who lack stable incomes from non-farming activities. Nevertheless, this
group has become considerably smaller due to new job opportunities in Yogyakarta
and beyond, and to the increased labor participation by women as domestic helpers
or workers in the garment and manufacturing industries. The poorest in Sriharjo
are still made up of those categories of people who lack access to local and supra-
local assets, resources, and income opportunities, in combination with a lack of
support from networks of family members. Examples are widow/ers without
children or with small children, the elderly without children, and the handicapped.
Also those depending on a single source of low income, such as agricultural
laborers, harvesters, rickshaw (becak) drivers, and construction workers, often
belong to the poor.
Unlike in the past, however, full-time farmers are no longer the well-off people
of Sriharjo. This category now includes better educated people who combine
farming with non-farming activities, such as teachers, army officials, traders, and
civil servants.
When the Crisis Came to Sriharjo
How did the villagers react when the prices of basic needs began to rise and
rumours of mass dismissals of workers in factories and construction sites spread
across Java? At first, villagers were constantly chatting about the crisis and its
causes, for example, during rotating saving groups (arisan), village meetings, and
night watches (ronda). They did not understand where the krismon30 originated,
and saw it as the source of all their problems, such as loss of jobs in the cities,
household budget problems, rising prices of basic needs, pesticides, and fertilizer.
In these discussions, various views were expressed about causes, ranging from
supernatural sanction to foreign conspiracy and including the scapegoating of the
Chinese minority. Gradually, discontent against the national and local government
rose, and consensus was reached in blaming the government and their ‘Chinese
friends.’
Some villagers viewed the events as severe, while others trusted that their
effects would be easily overcome. In general, villagers’ opinions varied with socio-
economic and demographic factors, such as occupation, age, social status, and
gender. Young people perceived krismon as a serious crisis, while the older
generations viewed it as a normal condition of rural life. According to the latter, a
crisis is a real famine where no food of good quality is available. These saw the
1998 crisis as only a minor turmoil, as basic needs were still available, albeit
expensive. For them, the lack of food is the main indicator of a crisis. In the 1930s,


trading birds. Unfortunately, they discovered that finding jobs was nearly impossible,
earnings from these were low, work was hard and of low status, and living and social
conditions in the village were not like in the city, and soon, some went back to the
city in search of work. By the end of 1998, most returnees had followed suit.
For commuters, traveling back and forth to Yogyakarta, the situation was
different. They immediately took up whatever work was available in the village
because they were already used to combining rural activities with their urban work.
Both groups constantly tried to get information about job openings from friends
and relatives, and some of them, indeed, found a new job quickly.
Those with good social networks were more successful than those operating
individually. For instance, unskilled construction workers, who used to work for a
broker, found work more quickly than skilled construction workers operating
alone. Some, however, unable to find a similar job, were forced to switch from
urban work to occasional rural work (buruh srabutan), such as cutting sugarcane,
milking cows, or gathering grass. This meant a real drop in status, and earnings
were not even enough to feed a family.35 In order to survive, they were forced to
downgrade their way of life: They had to mix rice with tiwul (low-quality food
made from dried cassava) and abstain from any side dish such as tempe, tahu,
fish, or egg; they also refrained from buying sugar or tea, switched to cheap,
sometimes self-made, cigarettes, and used only a little, poor-quality cooking oil.
According to many families, finding good food for their children and satisfying
their needs was a major concern. Most children had never eaten dried cassava, and
they also complained of feeling hungry (as cassava does not make one feel full),
stomach problems, and the bad smell of cheap rice.36
After one year of the crisis, some families suffered from lack of money for new
clothes. As one old man said: “At the moment, we eat just as we did in the Dutch
period: just rice mixed with cassava. Dried fish and clothes are difficult to get.
Fifty-three years of freedom didn’t bring us any profit at all. Moreover, it seems I
will have to wear clothes from sacks or bark again. These are my last clothes.”
Another major worry expressed by poorer villagers concerned the expected gifts
(sumbangan) for funerals and weddings. They were afraid that, by being unable to
afford these gifts, they would suffer from gossip and social exclusion, and be called
stingy or anti-social, since social relationships are essential for maintaining access
to social support. They tried, using all possible ways, to find money to stay part of
the ritual exchange networks of village society. Sumbangan is often viewed as a
leveling institution for mutual help (tolong-menolong; Koentjaraningrat 1967b) but,
in practice, it became a major burden for the poor, who found it increasingly
difficult to fulfill village obligations. During the crisis, the poor paid out relatively
more on premiums for social support than they received (Kutanegara forth.; Lont
2002a; Nooteboom 2003).
Not all villagers suffered from the crisis. Those who had good access to
resources such as land and cattle were able to maintain, or even improve, their
position. Those who earned an income from agriculture, and combined this with
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incomes from non-farm activities, benefited most. Villagers in the poorer areas of
Sriharjo who had cattle also benefited from rising prices by selling some of their
cows to buy a second-hand motorcycle: More than twenty people sold cattle, and
many motorcycles were acquired, not only for working outside Sriharjo, but also
for increasing social status.
The Crisis in Krajan
The Krajan Setting
The upland village of Krajan is located far from the large urban centers in Java, on
the northern slope of Mt. Argopura, in East Java.37 The nearest middle-sized city is
Jember, at a distance of sixty kilometers, but few villagers have ever gone there. In
Krajan, unlike Sriharjo, the majority (over 90%) of villagers engage in farming, often
supplemented with one or more other income-generating activities, such as trade,
handicraft production, and house construction. Unlike in many lowland Javanese
villages, migration rates are low38 and so remittances from outside are not very
significant to most household incomes. Three-quarters of the migrants during the
previous five years (before 1997) headed for Kalimantan, while others went to
Madura or Bali, or stayed in the region.
For Krajan, no baseline study, as for Sriharjo, was available. For this reason, we
extended the survey to issues of poverty perception, social support, consumption,
and diet. According to Singarimbun and Penny’s poverty line (incomes below 340
kg of rice per capita), two-thirds of the Krajan population is poor. Half of these, i.e.,
one-third of the total population, can even be labeled destitute. When compared to
villages in fertile areas in lowland Java, Krajan is a relatively poor village39, lacking
special resources such as extensive fertile sawah plots, or plantations.
Nevertheless, it is slightly better off than other villages in the region that have even
fewer resources, less fertile soils, and less rainfall. The Krajan agricultural system
consists mainly of maize, livestock, tobacco, and rice, although land is scarce and
not very fertile and yields tend to be unreliable. Rice, maize, and sometimes
tobacco are grown on the 10% of the land that is irrigated, the other 90% consisting
Table 1: Ownership of sawah and tegal per social class in Krajan (1997).
of dry land (tegal). In the tegal fields, maize, tobacco, and cassava are grown.
Table 1 shows the average ownership of land per social class.40
The rich (orang kaya) own 53% of the total sawah area.41 The poorest 32% of the
population own only 4% of all sawah owned by Krajan villagers.42 During the crisis,
there was no significant increase in selling of land, although pawning increased.
The few plots of land that changed hands in 1998 were all sold by smallholders to
larger landholders. No significant relation with the crisis could be observed.
Pawning land, however, was often due to increased debts related to illness, death,
or harvest failure, and the inability to pay them back.
When the Crisis Came to Krajan
When, in early 1998, we asked village men at the coffee stall about the crisis, we
often received a stereotypical and somewhat apathetic answer: “Crisis for us? We
here live in constant crisis” (di sini krisis terus). This illustrates the indifference to
the national crisis, predominantly perceived as an inflationary crisis. In the early
months of the crisis, the rising prices due to inflation attracted most attention from
women, and only at the washing place was it the talk of the day. In Krajan, price
hikes first became felt during the Ramadan month (December 1997 and January
1998),43 when villagers began preparing selamatan, cookies, and gifts for Idul Fitri.
They were not shocked, since prices usually rise during Ramadan but then return
to normal soon afterwards. That year, prices continued to increase after Ramadan,
and every villager experienced the higher than usual prices of rice, cooking oil,
flour, and clothes, and was forced to find a solution.
Table 2 shows in the left columns the perceived changes in the households’
socio-economic status since the previous survey, and in the last two columns the
effects on consumption levels are expressed in terms of food consumption.
Families facing higher costs and/or lower returns generally are inclined to first cut
expenses on luxury goods, such as radios, flashlights, batteries, new clothes, filter
cigarettes, and sandals, and then only cut down on food. For this reason, we
assume that changes in food consumption are a good indicator of those categories
severely affected by the crisis. Information was gathered (see Table 2) on the
consumption of the most common basic needs generally consumed in the village,
such as rice, maize (and rice mixed with maize or dried cassava), cassava,
vegetables, soybean cakes (tahu, tempe), eggs, noodles, dried fish, meat, coffee and
tea, tobacco or betel nuts.44
The survey shows that, on average, nearly three-quarters of the villagers felt that
they were severely hit by the crisis. Of the rich villagers, 46% perceived themselves
as not doing well: None had cut down on food consumption, but some had sold
motorbikes, cattle, or television sets to recoup losses in agriculture (especially
tobacco farming). The larger rice, maize, and cattle farmers, on the contrary, were
doing better due to the crisis and made good profits because of the rising market
prices for agricultural produce. Those producing large quantities of maize were
doing especially well, as maize prices increased three-fold and production costs
remained low.45
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The middle to upper classes (cukup, lebih, and kaya) realized that they could still
do quite reasonably well if they cut consumption according to their means, and
business opportunities increased for some. None of the richer villagers reduced
food consumption during the crisis, although some had to save on expensive
consumer goods. Moreover, most of the rich profited from rising prices for
agricultural produce, interest on bank accounts, and increasing trade opportunities.
It was especially the middle and lower classes that perceived themselves as not
doing well. Among them, the middle classes were cutting down most on food
consumption, while the poorest villagers (kasihan) did not (see Table 2). Middle-
class villagers could relatively easily save on expenditure by cutting out all luxuries
and shifting to cheaper kinds of food. Clearly, many of the poorest families, living
with no luxuries, could not cut down further on consumption, nor even on food
consumption, having already been eating the lowest-quality rice mixed with large
proportions of maize. Especially among this group, many were complaining about
bad health, or had fallen ill. They were among the hardest hit.46
Landless families in Krajan without high incomes responded to the crisis in
several ways.47 Even more than in the past, non-cash benefits were preferred to
cash benefits. Those dependent on labor relationships with returns in kind, such as
sharecropping and share harvesting, were not severely affected, while those
dependent on wages were. Those unable to get significant access to these kinds of
work could not do much more than cut their coat according to their cloth: They
only ate once or twice a day, mixed their rice with larger amounts of lower-quality
food such as maize or cassava. Much depended on the origin of their income. The
poor and destitute relying on wage incomes (like rural laborers in tobacco
production) experienced most pain due to the crisis’ inflationary aspects, as they
rarely owned enough land, had no reserves, and therefore were totally dependent
on cash incomes, however small these might be. Some were the first victims of the
crisis, due to loss of work and purchasing capacity. Others, usually widows, who
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Table 2: Percentages of perceived success or failure in Krajan in terms of socio-economic status,
and changes in food consumption per social class
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were allowed to glean after the harvest if they had good relations with landowners,
could reduce the pain to some extent. They did not experience major income
reduction as they could not fall down any further, having lived already for years on
the edge of starvation. Moreover, for these groups, the government’s cheap-rice
program was the last straw that they could clutch, since they generally did not own
land or have sufficient networks of support. Rice subsidies were a major help to
these people in preventing starvation.
About the Tengger area, East Java, Hefner notes that moral considerations in
caring for weaker members of society are largely absent in mountain societies:
“The social orientation emphasizes neither selfless collectivism nor self-possessed
individualism. Ideally households guarantee their own subsistence and welfare”.
About the moral village economy, he writes: “Its norms are most apparent not in
the realms of production, but in consumption and exchange […] Its effect is life-
style conformity, not selfless sharing” (Hefner 1990: 154). The latest crisis made
clear that Hefner’s observations applied in Krajan, since during crisis times, not
much of a village-wide social safety net was visible. Also, in Krajan, the ‘rule’ is that
villagers take care of their own social security, and only in cases of infrequent and
minor demands can the poor rely on opportunities for getting help from wealthier
villagers. Examples of this kind of support are small loans from patrons, wealthier
neighbors, or employers, labor opportunities, cash advancements, incidental free
meals, emotional support, and contributions at life-cycle festivals or communal
labor activities. These, usually minor, forms of care are, in general, only dispensed
to a limited number of people and only as long as it conforms with the interests of
the wealthy. They do not protect against the structural and negative effects of a
crisis. As the labor force was more abundant during the crisis than before, rich
villagers could find more than they needed to work in their fields, and incentives to
care for their needy fellow villagers were low.
The crisis revealed the weakness of village institutions of social security and the
narrow base of resource redistribution between rich and poor. In Krajan, conflicts
and competition, rather than harmony, between richer and poorer villagers
increased. Gossip, rumors, and complaints about richer villagers could be heard
more often than before. Some middle- and upper-class people complained about
the poor receiving support; allegedly, they, too, should receive help. On the other
hand, poorer villagers began speaking out louder, due not only to their increasing
poverty, but also to the political changes.
Sriharjo and Krajan Compared
In both villages, opinions on, and effects of the crisis varied with socio-economic
and demographic factors, such as status, occupation, age, and gender. Villagers
dependent on outside incomes or salaries were much more affected than those
controlling assets such as land and cattle in the village. Young people viewed
Krismon as a serious crisis, while the older generations considered it a normal
condition of rural life. In Sriharjo, the men seemed more concerned about
declining labor opportunities, in the towns and the city, and about dwindling
incomes than the women, while in Krajan the women were the first to worry about
the constantly rising prices and closely watched every increase.
The different perspectives between men and women came especially to the fore
due to differences in livelihood constitution. In general, women, being household
managers, faced more difficulties in coping with the increasing cost of basic needs
and, consequently, their perceptions tended to differ from the men’s. Those
confronted with reduced or stagnating household incomes cut more on
consumption than their husbands. Moreover, widows were among the hardest hit.
Conversely, women with independent incomes were less concerned. For instance,
women in some Krajan households had a surplus of maize (prices tripled during the
crisis), were engaged in trade, or produced good-quality baskets, and were less
complaining and better able to cope. These households had much better prospects,
under similar conditions, than those with women not engaged in income-generating
activities. Similar observations were made in Sriharjo: As men are generally more
engaged in the cash economy and cash-crop farming, the 1997 crisis was
predominantly a male crisis, if looked at from an income perspective.
As a side effect of the crisis and the proliferation of home-based work, labor
divisions between men and women also changed. Especially in Krajan, women in
poorer households, traditionally more strongly oriented toward the subsistence part
of the household, were in fact much more successful than men in securing
subsistence and coping with the crisis and, therefore, gained a stronger and more
independent position within the household and, in some cases, in the local
community.
The majority of the poor population in both Sriharjo and Krajan own no land and
depend on wage labor as their main source of income. After the crisis broke out, the
demand for wage laborers in Krajan decreased by more than 60% due to a shift from
labor-intensive cash crops (tobacco) to food crops (maize), and for independent
(non-tied) wage laborers, possibilities of finding paid work diminished to near zero.
In Sriharjo, the drop in rural labor demand was less dramatic, but a higher supply of
laborers due to returning migrants led to comparable, albeit temporary, rates of
unemployment. In Krajan, the village economy shifted from semi-subsistence back
to a strong subsistence economy. Forms of co-operative work, such as local forms of
gotong royong, exchange labor, rotating work groups, and helping-out labor,
increased in importance in both villages, due to rising labor supply and landowners’
inability or unwillingness to pay wages rather than to a wish for more cooperation.
In Sriharjo, family and kinship relations also gained importance, as migrants
returning from town and city could first fall back on them. After about a month,
however, returnees were expected to help in working and generate income, or to
leave. In Krajan, we did not see any increase in transfers of money or goods through
kinship lines, as ‘We all face the crisis,’ as the villagers put it. Only in the context of
the cheap-rice program did relatives sometimes offer loans to poorer kin. Informal
arrangements of mutual support were not important in fighting the negative aspects
of the crisis. Local arrangements for social security and mutual help are not
designed and equipped for these kinds of crises where everyone is affected.
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The crisis revealed the strength of those people’s livelihoods that are based on
varied sources of incomes, and the weaknesses of those dependent on only one
source, where the cash incomes were among the hardest hit, either in the village or
in town. Among those who had been doing better during the New Order era in
Krajan, the wage laborers, the losers could now be found.
Unlike in Sriharjo, labor migration in Krajan had not been massive, and not many
returned. Most out-migration from Krajan is rural to rural (especially Kalimantan).
Those who used to regularly go to Bali decided to stay home after receiving news
that business in Bali was slack. Many villagers in Kalimantan did not wish to return,
as the situation in the outer islands was better, or were stuck these because they
could not afford the boat trip. Only in 1999 did migration began increasing again,
and many former wage laborers found work in the forests of Banyuwangi and
earned reasonable incomes that they brought home to buy rice. These were among
the first to recover, after only temporarily falling below the poverty line.
In Sriharjo, similar processes took place. In 1999, the returnees from the cities
had already found new work opportunities outside the village. Those returnees
who had not been able to find new occupations outside the village were facing
severe cutbacks in expenditure and had lost contact with their old social networks
in the city that were crucial for finding work.
GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN THE VILLAGES
More than a year passed after the crisis began in mid-1997 before the national
government took serious action to fight its effects on the rural poor. As Breman
noted: “In opposition to those who argued that informal arrangements, to the
extent that they existed, would be totally inadequate for helping the poor to deal
with their loss of income and the rising prices of basic needs, other observers
warned against doling out assistance which would be cost-free. These and more
dominant voices exhorted the Indonesian government and major international
agencies not even to explore that option because, once introduced, it would be
very difficult to discontinue public provisions to which people had become
entitled” (Breman 2000: 41). When the extent and impact of the crisis gradually
became clear, the government, fueled by fear of political turmoil and riots,
implemented policies targeting the poor in rural areas. Most were part of JPS,48 the
Social Safety Net program, reluctantly sponsored by the World Bank and IMF, as a
tiny part of a huge US$ 50 billion restructuring program with the economic and
political objective of addressing the immediate threat to the livelihoods of massive
numbers of people (ibid.: 42).
The beginning of the crisis can be characterized by a general lack of policies,
both at the national and regional levels, both in Sriharjo and Krajan. The regional
government that deals with village affairs is situated at the district (kecamatan) and
regency (kabupaten) levels. Officials at these levels had been used to carrying out
top-down programs of the national government, and were not very sensitive to the
differential needs of local people. 
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The first special aid programs for the poor, who were no longer able to buy food,
started in April 1998. Some government departments, the army, and private donors
(Muslim, Christian, and Chinese organizations) supplied basic goods (rice, cooking
oil, salt) to the rural poor. Locally simply called sembako, these aid campaigns,
often spontaneous and not based on reliable data, involved much showing off,
haphazard organization, and random distribution. In Krajan, the village head simply
ruled that some families in his neighborhood and some of his most loyal followers
were poor and thus entitled to the aid packages. Criteria for selection were not
clear and often the neediest received nothing, while others, close to village
officials, could secure one or more packages. The more remote hamlets of Krajan
received less aid than those near the center. This whole campaign of spontaneous
sembako aid was more symbolic than effective: Krajan received on five occasions
around 150 packages, while the needy required much more.
Of more significance was the JPS sembako, beginning only later (October 1998),
whereby the government doled out cheap rice (@ Rp 1,000 per kg) on a monthly
basis. In Krajan, the sembako aid was overwhelming due to the village head’s good
relations with regional politicians and the military. In the first few months, the
village was issued 12 tons of rice (around 1,200 packages) for a population of 3,400
people, including 550 poor families. The ensuing decrease of the rice prices in the
village led to a dozen small shops going bankrupt, as their owners were mainly
dependent on selling rice. The number of packages was so high that it was
sometimes hard to find buyers, because many poor villagers lacked cash. Therefore,
middle- and upper-class villagers were also entitled to buy them.
After two months, the village head, and later his secretary, began selling some of
the rice illegally to shops in Bondowoso town at market prices.49 Also, regional
government officers and employees of Bulog (the national agency in charge of rice
distribution) in Bondowoso took advantage of the situation. In villages around
Krajan, the weight of rice sacks was always 5% to 10% below standard. Government
officers at district level sold this shortfall “to cover the cost of their extra work,” as
they justified it.
In other village aid projects of this period, regional and lower-level government
employees seemed to benefit from the aid programs. The cheap credit programs
(KUT) in Krajan, for example, were considerably extended for the 1998/99 planting
season. However, few funds became available for farmers, and two-thirds of the
funds (more than Rp 150 million) were used by the village head for his own ends,
such as his re-election campaign (Nooteboom 2001: 369). In Krajan, KUT money
flows were difficult for villagers to monitor, and open criticism of the uses of these
funds was seldom heard due to fear of sanctions from the village head.
Despite these failures of the cheap-rice program, most of the poor in Krajan,
shocked as they were by the sudden fall of their purchasing power, remained able
to buy cheap rice on a monthly basis and were definitely helped by this kind of aid,
which kept them from starvation. Unfortunately, the poorest had no access to this
program, as even Rp 10,000 was too much for them and they were unable to obtain
income and credit. Only after some time were they offered loans from the main
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shop owner in the village, the village head’s mother, who asked in return for 60% of
the aid rice that they bought, which she then re-sold in her shop at a considerable
profit. Ultimately, thus, like in Srihardjo, the upper and middle classes took
advantage of this program and procured a large piece of the pie.
Sriharjo and Krajan Compared
Did the local government (village head, village officials, and regency officials) pay
enough attention to the impact of the crisis on the rural poor? When in 1998 we
asked local government employees what they were doing about it, they said: “The
crisis is not so severe in the villages as in the cities. Pity those in the cities who
cannot eat. For us, here in the villages, the situation is reasonably good. We can still
freely pick leaves to add to our food”. It was in the same words that they reported
on the village situation to the regional government officials. To a certain extent,
they did believe that in their own villages few people were affected, thus ignoring
the hundreds of families who were facing serious problems in making ends meet.
There were three reasons for this clear ignorance of problems in their own
villages: 1) local village officials did not know much about poor people in their own
villages; they hardly ever met them, and villagers tend to conceal poverty, making it
somewhat invisible; 2) they were influenced by the dominant discourses in the
media and higher government echelons that only depicted the severe situation in
the cities; 3) in general, such officials are more geared towards serving the higher
levels of government than to serving the villagers; thus, they were busy carrying
out government programs and instructions from above, and incapable of addressing
the villagers’ specific problems and needs. The village officials were unable to
convey the villagers’ needs to higher levels, and did little to enhance the poor’s
living conditions. They never proposed new ideas or programs adapted to the
poor’s needs, and they continued to carry out government programs, which in
practice benefited the rural middle class more than the poorest of the poor.
The impact of the crisis made painfully clear that the Indonesian government
was a source of insecurity more often than a provider of social safety. Other
features of the JPS (Social Safety Net) programs hardly ever reached Krajan, and we
were not in a position to report on what happened with the funds available for
these programs at the district or regency levels, beyond the fact that no significant
programs for increasing employment, education, or access to health were carried
out at the village level.
In general, poorer villagers eventually benefited mostly from the subsidies on the
nine strategic basic commodities (sembako), which kept prices low, and from the
specific features of their village’s economy, which, in the case of Krajan, enabled
nearly half of the population, both rich and poor, to fall back on subsistence
production. Kinship relations played only a minor role in this, as family members
could only be helped out on a temporary basis and access by the majority of the
rural population to work and resources in the villages was limited. More important
than all the government programs and local forms of welfare, however, were non-
agricultural sources of income, such as cottage industries (garments, embroidery,
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or baskets), which enabled the rural poor to generate a modest income alongside
their subsistence sources.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Levinsohn et al. wrote about the 1997 crisis in Indonesia: “We find that the poor have
indeed been hit hardest. Just how hard the poor have been hit, though, depends
crucially on where the household lives, whether the household is in rural or urban
area, and just how the cost of living index is computed. What is clear is that the
notion that the very poor are so poor as to be insulated from international shocks is
simply wrong. Rather, in the Indonesian case, the very poor appear the most
vulnerable” (Levinsohn et al. 1999: II). We have tried to refine such statements.
Although we came to the same conclusion about the very poor, who did, indeed,
appear to be the most vulnerable, poverty studies such as that of Levinsohn et al.
sometimes raise more questions than answers, as they do not tell us why some
people are hit harder than others, which people are hit hardest, or how people
perceived the crisis and actually coped with it. Moreover, the question can be
raised as to why some categories of poor are hit harder than others, and why some
people recover more quickly than others. This is not a matter of region, location, or
being urban or rural.
The lack of high incomes or ownership of property, as such, do not much define
the negative effects of the crisis. Having social relationships of support is
important, but having social relations offering access to resources, information, and
work is even more important. For this reason, we come to a categorization of the
losers of the crisis that differs from social classes mentioned previously. In doing
this, we define four categories of vulnerable villagers: 1) the weak and already
poor, such as widows and widowers, chronically ill people, and the elderly, with
little or no access to resources, or caring relations, and hardly any capability of
working; 2) the poor who have been poor for a long time, do not have assets, such
as cows, land, and other means of production, and who have poor access to stable
income and work; 3) the new poor, i.e., those groups of people who were just able
to make a sufficient living and remain part of society before the crisis, but then
faced a major setback due to diminishing returns from products and labor, and
consequently were forced to sell, pawn, or rent out productive assets while losing
access to non-farm employment (often in cities); and 4) the temporary poor, i.e.,
those villagers who fell into poverty by losing their job, or by a severe drop in
income due to inflation, but who were able to cope, and soon found new work (in
Krajan, people started to migrate and added to their income by working seasonally
outside the village).
The first three categories comprise the structural poor, and for them a national
recovery from the crisis will make little difference. Many of the new poor have lost
structural access to sources of income and capital, such as land, cows, and work.
Especially for them, more drastic measures should be taken to improve their socio-
economic conditions. The most important effect of the crisis has been that the
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number of structural poor in rural areas has increased, and the gap between rich
and poor has widened still further.
This crisis also reveals the weaknesses of the local and regional governments to
come up with adequate responses. Why did they perform so badly in rural Java, and
why did they initially think that help was not needed? At the beginning of the
crisis, the government was very hesitant to take action. It still seemed to believe
that the rural areas were not badly affected and could cope with the difficulties by
themselves. The main reason for the many problems related to the help programs
in the villages was muddled, unreliable data. Over the years, many studies on rural
Java have been published in Indonesia about poverty, inequality, social change, and
village life. Most of these only partly or indirectly touch on people’s lives in coping
with the consequences of this poverty, and offer a static, limited, romanticized or
distorted picture of Java’s rural societies. In the dominant government discourse,
villages are often regarded as homogeneous and harmonious communities, able to
care for their weaker members by gotong royong and other local arrangements of
solidarity and mutual help.50 The crisis revealed that this stereotypical and
erroneous view had blinded government officials and intellectuals to the hardships
of the rural poor and existing inequalities between regions, economic sectors,
classes, and within villages. It explains the often weak and misplaced responses of
the government in the early stages. The crisis also revealed the dormant and
hidden conflicts, hierarchies, and competition between villagers. Free handouts of
food packages triggered jealousy between hamlets, different social strata, and
especially among neighborhoods and within families.
In his influential book, Agricultural Involution, Clifford Geertz claims that
widespread leveling mechanisms of shared poverty exist in rural Java and argues
that rural populations in Java reacted to population pressure and decreasing
resources by sharing their poverty and by the intensification of labor in wet-rice
production (Geertz 1963), although his idea of “shared poverty” has been revised
by later research on Java showing widespread inequality and poverty in rural
economies and disproving the existence of a shared poverty ethic.51 Ben White, for
example, offers a clear comment on the idea of shared poverty: “…No observer
would dispute the existence of a pervasive public ideology of sharing and
reciprocity in Javanese society – nor the widespread, actual ‘sharing of poverty’
within the marginal and landless classes – the crucial error of agricultural
involution lies in assigning to this ethic a determinant role in regulating the actual
relations of distribution between classes” (White 1983: 23). Many Javanese
villages, although they may display a morality of sharing, tend to be highly
inegalitarian with regard to the distribution of resources as our data shows. In the
whole of Java, landlessness and near-landlessness were widespread phenomena
during the New Order rule. In 1983, some 43% of the rural population had no land
at all (Hüsken & White 1989: 256-257).
The discussion of sharing versus inequality in rural Java lingers on, sometimes
hidden, to the present day. Associated with this is the debate as to whether New
Order changes in agriculture led to more wealth for all, or to a new schism in
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society. For instance, Edmundson (1994) states that, on average, inequalities in the
distribution of wealth in rural areas did not increase. Others have shown that
incomes of larger landowners increased, and that labor wages increased, but more
slowly, and that the gap between rich and poor increased (White & Wiradi 1989:
298-299). At the same time, other important changes in the rural wage structure
took place, such as diminishing harvest shares (wages in kind; see Hüsken & White
1989: 254). The crisis reveals that these processes are still going on. The Javanese
village has often been mythologized as harmonious due to the existence of
different arrangements of mutual help (Geertz 1963, Koentjaraningrat 1967a,
1967b, Jay 1969). Why is this image still so strong?
It might be beneficial for some groups in Indonesia to maintain this distorted
discourse. During the 1997 crisis, politicians believed too easily that the effects of
the crisis were not as bad in villages as in urban areas. Recognition of the
problematic effects of the crisis on poverty in rural areas would have entailed
taking action. They opted to focus on the huge urban problems, and tried to
strengthen the existing village community held together by gotong royong,
solidarity, and mutual help by preaching and stressing ‘traditional’ values. They
could do so more easily because urban elites rarely went to and stayed in villages,
and so simply did not know much about disharmony and inequalities among groups
and classes, and between local areas within villages. If we, then, want to group
current social realities in rural Java, we must set aside such classical views of the
Javanese countryside, and move beyond agricultural involution and social class (or
rich vs. poor) dichotomies.
We have presented a more internal view of society, showing the variety of kinds
of poverty, social relationships, and ways of access. Our study reminds us that
poverty figures in rural Java are still very high, and remain a persisting reality, too
often overlooked. Any policy not taking into account the diversities and inequalities
at the local level runs the risk of failure. As long as general goals and solutions are
presented as solutions to specific problems, policies will never be fully effective.
The crisis made clear that local government under the New Order regime was an
administrative unit incapable of fighting poverty and inequality. At the local level,
the government administrative systems were not sufficiently equipped for properly
reporting on effects and needs to higher echelons of their hierarchy, let alone for
anticipating and fighting the effects of the crisis. Looking at recent developments in
Indonesia, political unrest, stagnating reformation, and a weakening state, we are
left to wonder whether the storm will soon be over.
Notes
1 On the outer islands, see Angelsen & Resosudarmo 1999; Sunderlin et al. 2000. But the good prices for
export goods and the increased incomes for farmers in the outer islands must be balanced against rising
prices of production and consumer goods (Sunderlin et al. 2000: 3). When the first phase of booming
prices was over, rising prices also became a problem for these export-oriented producers.
2 The article is based on two Ph.D. research studies carried out from mid-1997 to the end of 1998, and at
the beginning of 1999 (see Kutanegara forth., Nooteboom 2003). Both are part of a project on Social
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Security and Social Policy in Indonesia, carried out by Gadjah Mada University (Yogyakarta) and the
universities of Amsterdam and Nijmegen, and sponsored by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and
Sciences (KNAW). The present article builds upon three early publications based on the same research
(Kutanegara & Nooteboom 2000, 2002, Nooteboom 2001) We are grateful to Frans Hüsken, Milan Titus,
Hotze Lont, Bernard Sellato, and unknown referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft. We also
thank Rene van der Haar for bibliographic and editing assistance.
3 This research is an extension of the well-known poverty studies by Masri Singarimbun (1976, 1996).
4 Krajan is a pseudonym.
5 Although the two surveys were not exactly the same, due to a slightly different general research
question (Sriharjo being a restudy), the topics covered were the same, and the methodology was
comparable.
6 In the 1998 survey, we collected information on incomes, expenditures, labor activities, food
consumption, and forms of mutual help. This forms an interesting baseline of incomes and expenditures.
In the 1999 survey, in May-July, we again focused on these issues, but added specific questions on the
crisis in order to analyze its effects in more detail. We were able to retrace 98% of the households.
7 In most lowland regions of Java, worries about rising prices began earlier, as a greater fraction of the
population was working in cities and depending on wage labor, and had better access to price
information and income.
8 See, for instance, Koning 2000, 2001a/b, Sandee & Andadari 2000.
9 Koning 2001a/b, Persoon & Osseweijer 2000, White et al. 2002a.
10 On this declining attention to rural areas, see Breman 2000, Holtzappel et al. 2002, Hüsken 1999,
Koning forth., Lont 2002a/b.
11 See Holtzappel et al. (2002: 12-15), who use the metaphor of ‘riding a tiger’ for the Indonesian
government trying to remain in the saddle.
12 Among early studies: ILO 1998, Nehru et al. 1998, Levinsohn et al. 1999. According to Lont, these were
based on large-scale surveys, such as those by BPS (National Statistical Office) and IFLS (Indonesian
Family Life Survey): “The large-scale statistical studies have been very influential in creating the
dominant image of the crisis among the general public and among policy makers. Their reports are
published quickly, and easily accessible through the Internet. They are quasi-authoritative and used by
many economists” (Lont 2002b: 3).
13 For studies oriented mainly towards urban areas or urban problems, see Hill 1999, ILO 1998, Jellinek &
Rustanto 1999, Leeuwen 2000, Nehru et al. 1998, Yanagihara 1999.
14 For comments on the reliability of census data, see also Hull 2001.
15 Exceptions are the studies by Levinsohn et al. (1999) and Jellinek & Rustanto (1999), based on survey
data in both rural and urban areas. During the crisis, more micro and less statistical analyzes were
carried out (some not having yet resulted in official publications): Biezeveld 2002, Breman 2000, De
Jonge 1999, Hüsken 1999, Koning 2000, 2001a/b, Kutanegara & Nooteboom 2000, Lont 1999, 2002a/b,
Marianti 1999, Sandee & Andadari 2000, White 1999, White & Abdullah 1999, Wiradi 1999.
16 Sembako is the acronym for sembilan bahan pokok, the “nine basic goods,” including rice, flour, sugar,
salt, frying oil, and kerosene.
17 For instance, the Australian economist Hal Hill summarized these achievements and stated that the New
Order regime had been successful in creating rural development and improving rural people’s livelihoods
(Hill 1996). Such views have been challenged. Others (e.g., White 2000) comment that this development
has never been steady or accessible to all.
18 Studies on the socio-economic consequences of the Green Revolution include: Collier 1981, Hart et al.
1989, Hüsken 1988, 1989, 1999, Hüsken & Kemp 1992, Hüsken & White 1989, White & Wiradi 1989,
Wiradi 1984.
19 Improvement of transport and migration opportunities.
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20 See Breman 2000, Edmunson 1994, Hart et al. 1989, White 2000, White & Wiradi 1989.
21 Most of these processes took place in lowland Java. In less densely populated highland areas, however,
similar agricultural revolutions also took place. Hefner (1990), who did research in highland East Java,
some 50 km from Krajan, mentions one of the consequences: “Right up through the late 1960s, cheap
land had been a distinctive feature of upland society. As has been reported elsewhere in Southeast Asia
(Scott 1985: 69) the green revolution has changed this. […] For the land-poor, the escalation in land
prices represents a development as significant as the closing of forestlands at the beginning of the
century. A small window of opportunity has closed. The very developments that have brought prosperity
to more affluent farmers have reduced economic mobility among the poor. Long more permeable than in
lowland society, the boundary between landed and landless has become firmer” (Hefner 1990: 130).
22 See Edmunson 1994, Singarimbun 1996, Singarimbun & Penny 1973, White 2000.
23 See Breman 2000, Levinsohn et al. 1999, Nehru et al. 1998.
24 For examples of this kind of poverty studies, applied in Indonesia, see Singarimbun & Penny 1973 and
Sajogyo 1986. Their main achievement has been to bring the problem of widespread rural poverty in
Indonesia to attention. They tried to improve monetary poverty definitions by using rice as a criterion of
poverty: The “destitute poor” are those with incomes below 240 kg rice equivalent/capita/year, while the
“poor” have less than 320 kg (Singarimbun & Penny 1973). This definition of poverty, although a major
improvement at that time, remains rather static and income-oriented. It also failed to take social
exchange and support relationships into account.
25 Since the end of the 1980s, the study of local forms of social security has gained momentum, e.g.,
Ahmad et al. 1991, Von Benda-Beckmann 1994, Von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1988, Biezeveld 2002, Van
Dijk 1994, Van Ginneken 1999, Hirtz 1995, Leliveld 1994, Platteau 1991.
26 The use of traditional, indigenous, or informal social security is problematic, due to false connotations and
dichotomies. For a discussion of misleading dichotomies, such as formal-informal and traditional-modern,
see Von Benda-Beckmann 1994, Von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1988, Midgley 1994. We prefer to use the
phrase “local social security” to stress the heterogeneity and embeddedness of this social security in local
communities and in often quite specific localities. Compare with the phrases “rural people’s knowledge”
or “local knowledge” (Scoones & Thompson 1994), in contrast to “indigenous/traditional knowledge.”
Local social security contrasts with state-organized social security.
27 Singarimbun & Penny 1973, Singarimbun 1996.
28 Defined as an income of less than 320 kg rice per capita per year (Singarimbun & Penny 1973,
Singarimbun 1996).
29 See Hayami and Kikuchi’s hypothesis: With agricultural modernization, increasing numbers of the rural
population will lose access to land (Hayami & Kikuchi 1981: 326, Kikuchi et al. 1981: 326).
30  An acronym for krisis moneter, monetary crisis.
31 Villagers call this the era of shortages, or the wasted or “missed era,” jaman meleset.
32 They often put it this way: Kami harus/selalu hidup prihatin, “We must/always live a prihatin life.”
Although the first meaning of prihatin is “worried, preoccupied, concerned,” the word refers here more
to its second meaning of “frugal” and to eating less, sleeping less, and demanding less. “We have to be
tough and patient and entrust our lives to God’s mercy.” These statements, however, generate more
questions than answers, as they did not reflect the people’s actual circumstances, and are public, often
sociably acceptable expressions.
33 Two-thirds of the people working outside the village were male. The rest consisted of women, usually
much younger (often unmarried), who, for this reason, were probably more flexible. Taking these
proportions into account, twice as many male laborers were dismissed.
34 In general, few domestic servants were fired after the crisis, although working conditions often
deteriorated. Workers in the textile industry were protected by one of the managers who originated from
Sriharjo.
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35 The average wage for this kind of work was Rp 4,000 for a long working day excluding breakfast or
lunch. The price of rice was more than Rp 3,000 per kg.
36 For food preferences, tastes, the perception of low-quality food, and Javanese concepts of “full” (wareg)
and “hungry”, see Indiyanto 2001: 327-339.
37 Krajan, at about 1,000 m asl, is one of eight villages of kecamatan Pakem, kabupaten Bondowoso.
38 Less than 10% of the households have a member working elsewhere.
39 Krajan is a so-called IDT village, benefiting from a government program (Inpres Desa Tertinggal) to assist
settlements “left-behind” by development.
40 Socio-economic inequalities are obvious to all villagers, and in assessing each others’ wealth and status in
the local hierarchy, people appeared to use a ranking system on which nearly everybody agreed. In its
general form, it roughly follows a tripartite division: the well off, those who can more or less manage,
and the poor. In discussing individual cases, however, people make further subdivisions, and the overall
local wealth-ranking system turned out to consist of six categories: ‘rich’ (kaya), ‘enough’ (lebih or maju),
‘just enough’ (cukup), ‘insufficient’ (kurang), ‘poor’ (miskin), and ‘destitute’ (susah or kasihan). We
crosschecked this ranking with the compulsory contribution (the equivalent of local tax) to the annual
village festival (selamatan desa), as listed by the hamlet heads (kepala dusun). Further, we discussed the
attributed social position of households with their members themselves. A general point for calibration
between higher and lower classes in terms of wealth ranking is the notion of cukup or pas-pasan. Cukup
implies that the household has enough to fulfill its needs and live decently, including the capacity to
perform all the required selamatan and other social obligations in the village. When we compared this
ranking system with incomes computed in rice, it corresponded largely with the 320 kg per capita used
by Singarimbun and Penny (1973; see also White & Wiradi 1989: 293).
41 This includes the ownership of sawah outside Krajan, in three neighboring villages.
42 Some 40% of the total population of Krajan had no sawah at all, and half of these were found in the
lowest category; 53% of the poor category and 37% of the category of the less poor had no sawah at all.
Remarkably, in the category cukup, everyone had at least some sawah, while among the richest villagers
interviewed, 11% did not own any sawah because, having other sources of income, they no longer
needed any. The richest 25% of the survey population own 74% of all village sawah. The poorest 25%
virtually own no sawah (0.7%; only two had a tiny piece of sawah).
43 Five months after the first devaluation of the Rupiah in July 1997.
44 We excluded smoking from the calculations, as many men had increased smoking due to stress and fewer
work opportunities (where the landowner usually provides tobacco); most families had shifted to
cheaper brands.
45 Data of May–July 1999. Maize was not part of the sembako program, and its price was not subsidized.
Some middle-class farmers sold maize to buy cattle, which astonished fellow villagers, as maize had
never been an important commodity in Krajan.
46 There are several reasons for this: 1) poorer villagers pay relatively more for funerals, selamatan, and
weddings, while they receive less support at these occasions since their networks are smaller, and their
friends and relatives are often also poor; 2) those engaged in mutual help and mutual labor groups
generally expend more labor on richer neighbors then they receive, due to differences in plot size; 3)
corvée labor and services provided to richer village members, politicians, relatives, and patrons are
investments and premiums that generally cost more than the social security ever provided in return; 4)
those who need credit most can borrow least, and pay the highest interest. On the performance of local
social security in Indonesia, see Von Benda-Beckmann 1999, Von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1994, Von
Benda-Beckmann et al. 2001, Biezeveld 2002, Ingleson 1996, Koning 2001b, Lont 2002a, Nooteboom
2003.
47 “Landless” refers to those with little or no land, although some of the landless have rights of use over
some land (land on which the house stands, a home garden, pekarangan, or adjacent plot). We use as a
definition of landless those people whose domestic production does not exceed more than two months
worth of food (paddy, maize, or cassava) or who do not share a household with those who have access to
resources. Landlessness, on average, refers to those families owning less than 0.1 ha of sawah in Krajan
or less than 0.2 ha of tegalan (dry land) in Sriharjo (the figure is lower for sawah, which is more
productive).
48 Jaring Pengaman Sosial.
49 In one of the peak months, the village secretary sold at least five tons of rice back to town. With the
profits, he built a new house.
50 The anthropologist Jellinek stated in 1999 that the effects of the crisis that hit Indonesia a year before
had not affected rural people that much (Jellinek 1999). After carrying out for the World Bank a rapid
appraisal in some urban and rural areas, she concluded that these effects were much worse in the cities
(see also Jellinek & Rustanto 1999). At the beginning of the 1997 crisis, Harmoko, the spokesman of
Parliament and a prominent member of the ruling party Golkar, inspected rural areas in Central Java
(Safari Ramadhan), speaking to village officials and having a good dinner (buka puasa) in one village. He
then declared to the national television and newspapers that the situation was not so bad because he had
had a good meal, implying that much food was available in the villages (see, e.g., Jawa Pos, December
1997). The Indonesian delegation at the UN-World Population Summit in Cairo in 1994, asked about
possible future problems in the care for the elderly as a result of demographic changes, replied: “We do
not have this problem, as in our country children care for their parents” (Niehof 1995). See also a
discussion of government construction of Indonesian mutual-help traditions (Bowen 1986).
51 For extensive debates on Geertz’ shared poverty and agrarian involution, see Hart et al. 1989, White
1983.
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Abstract: In the dominant discourse in Indonesia, villages are often viewed as harmonious,
homogeneous communities, able to care for their weaker members by gotong royong and
other traditional arrangements of solidarity and mutual help. The 1997 economic crisis reveals
that this stereotypical view has blinded government officials and intellectuals to the hardships
of the rural poor and to existing inequalities in rural areas and between regions. Two detailed
case studies of villages in Java show the persistence of widespread inequality and poverty, the
crisis’ differential impact on richer and poorer people, and the local government’s inability to
deal with local problems. The impact of the crisis on rural Java has been severe for the struc-
tural poor, villagers without access to land, capital, a stable income, and good social relations.
National recovery will make little difference to them, since they will not directly benefit from
it. For them, and the new poor, who lost structural access to resources during the crisis, more
drastic measures should be taken, which, however, can only be carried out if the local govern-
ment has been reformed and trained for its new tasks.
« La tempête passera-t-elle bientôt ? ».
La crise de 1997 en milieu rural à Java
Résumé : dans le discours en vigueur en Indonésie, le village est souvent envisagé comme une
communauté homogène et harmonieuse, capable de prendre en charge ses économiquement
faibles grâce au gotong royong et à d’autres dispositifs traditionnels de solidarité et d’entraide.
La crise économique de 1997 révèle que ce stéréotype empêcha les bureaucrates et les intel-
lectuels de percevoir les difficultés éprouvées par les pauvres en région rurale et les inégalités
existant entre les régions et au sein de chaque région. Deux études détaillées de villages de Java
démontrent la persistance et l’étendue de l’inégalité et de la pauvreté, l’impact différentiel de
la crise sur les riches et les pauvres et l’incapacité des autorités locales de traiter les problèmes
à leur niveau. L’impact de la crise sur les régions rurales de Java fut rude pour les démunis struc-
turels : les villageois sans terre, sans capital, sans revenu stable et sans un bon réseau de rela-
tions sociales. Le redressement économique national, dont ils ne bénéficieront pas directement,
ne leur apportera pas de notable amélioration. Pour cette catégorie et celle des nouveaux
pauvres, qui ont perdu pendant la crise leur accès structurel aux ressources (terre, etc.), des
mesures draconiennes devront être prises, qui ne pourront cependant être mises en applica-
tion que lorsque les instances gouvernementales locales auront été réformées et formées à
leurs nouvelles responsabilités.
Key-words: Indonesia, rural Java, crisis, socio-economic analysis, local level, responses, poverty.
Mots-clés : Indonésie, Java rural, crise, analyse socio-économique, niveau local, réactions, 
pauvreté.
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